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ABSTRACT: We test the relationship between the change in a firm’s cost of debt and
the disclosure of a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report. We find that, on
average, a firm’s credit spread on its publicly traded debt marginally increases if it
discloses a material weakness. We also examine the impact of monitoring by credit
rating agencies and/or banks on this result and find that the result is more pronounced
for firms that are not monitored. Additional analysis indicates that the effect of bank
monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring results. This finding is
consistent with the argument that banks are effective delegated monitors for the debt
market. The results of this study suggest the need for future research, particularly to test
the differential effects of monitoring on the cost of debt compared to the cost of equity.
Keywords: cost of debt; monitoring of debt; bank monitoring; Section 404 reporting.
Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
ection 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, Sarbanes-Oxley) requires a
publicly traded firm’s Form 10-K to contain an audited report concerning the effectiveness
of the firm’s internal control over financial reporting. Under the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Final Rule on management’s reporting on the effectiveness of internal control
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over financial reporting, and under Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS 2), which were in effect during the time period examined in our study,
firms are required to disclose in the Section 404 report any material weakness in internal control
over financial reporting (SEC 2003; PCAOB 2004). By definition in AS 2, a material weakness
indicates a more than remote likelihood that a material misstatement will not be prevented or
detected in a firm’s financial statements.1,2 Section 404 became effective for fiscal years ending on
or after November 15, 2004, for accelerated filers, defined as U.S. companies with an equity market
capitalization exceeding $75 million that file Form 10-K.
In this study, we use the release of an initial Section 404 report as a natural experiment to test
whether the cost of a firm’s publicly traded debt increases if it discloses a material weakness
(hereafter, MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We have several reasons to expect that
weak internal control over financial reporting is associated with a higher cost of debt. For example,
weak internal control over financial reporting leads to a decrease in the precision of financial
reporting numbers. This decrease in precision means that debt investors have less reliable
information to assess default risk and to determine compliance with debt covenants (i.e., estimation
risk increases), which leads investors to charge a higher cost of debt (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).
Moreover, weak internal control over financial reporting suggests that managers find it easier to
misappropriate a firm’s cash flows (Lambert et al. 2007), thus increasing default risk, which again
leads investors to charge a higher cost of debt. If weak internal control over financial reporting is
associated with a higher cost of debt, then we predict that the disclosure of a MW in an initial
Section 404 report is associated with an increase in the cost of a firm’s publicly traded debt. We find
marginal support for this prediction (p = 0.099).
Even though we find that the disclosure of a MW is associated with an increase in a firm’s cost
of debt, it is possible that this finding may not hold equally between firms that are monitored and
firms that are not monitored by credit rating agencies and/or banks. To our knowledge, prior
research has not studied the impact of monitoring on the response of markets to the information in a
Section 404 report. In Section II, we predict that the increased cost of debt associated with MW
disclosure is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored than for firms that are monitored by
credit rating agencies and/or banks. We find strong support for this prediction. Additional analysis
indicates that the effect of bank monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring
results. This finding is consistent with the argument that banks have a comparative advantage in
carrying out information search and monitoring activities.
Ogneva et al. (2007) find that the effect of Section 404 requirements on a firm’s cost of equity
is strongest for delinquent filers. Also, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2005a) states that Moody’s
views a filing delay as indicating the most serious internal control over financial reporting problems.
Consistent with these observations, we find that delinquent filers have an increase in their cost debt
after the required initial Section 404 report filing date relative to firms that file a timely report.
1 More specifically, a material weakness is defined as a significant deficiency, or combination of significant
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim
financial statements will not be prevented or detected (PCAOB 2004). Firms are not required to disclose in a
Section 404 report control deficiencies or significant deficiencies that do not rise to the level of a material
weakness.
2 Based on feedback received, including criticism that AS 2 was too costly and resulted in inefficient audits of
internal controls, AS 2 was superseded by AS 5 (PCAOB 2007). AS 5 was effective for fiscal years ending on or
after November 15, 2007, with early adoption permitted. Like AS 2, AS 5 continues to require disclosures of
material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. However, the definition of material weakness in
AS 5 is somewhat less inclusive than in AS 2. In particular, AS 5 uses the terminology ‘‘a reasonable possibility’’
rather than ‘‘a more than remote likelihood’’ that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected. We
have no reason to believe that our results would have been different under AS 5.
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When we partition sample firms by their ex ante probability of reporting a MW in an initial
Section 404 report, we find that low-probability firms have a larger increase in their cost of debt in
response to reporting a MW than high-probability firms. This result is consistent with the notion
that the debt market is more surprised when a firm with a low ex ante probability of reporting a MW
actually reveals a MW than when this occurs for a high ex ante probability firm.
Concurrent studies by Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) use
bank loan credit spreads to examine some of the same issues that we investigate. The major
difference between these two studies and our study is that Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) focus on the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley reporting requirements in the
private debt market, while we focus on this impact in the public debt market. As further discussed in
Section VI, all three studies find that a firm’s cost of debt increases after it discloses a MW. Thus,
we view the three studies as complementary in that they collectively provide evidence that
Sarbanes-Oxley reporting requirements can impact a firm’s cost of debt in both the private debt
market and the public debt market.
Our study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of Section 404 disclosures on the
cost of debt rather than on the cost of equity.3 One benefit to examining the cost of debt is that measures
of the cost of debt are better defined and easier to estimate than measures of the cost of equity.4 A more
important benefit is that examining debt allows us to analyze the effect of monitoring, or a lack of
monitoring, by two debt monitors (i.e., credit rating agencies and banks) on the relationship between
the cost of debt and the disclosure of a MW. This analysis allows us to assess the impact that
monitoring has on the response of markets to the information in a Section 404 report. This assessment
of monitoring effects is valuable because, to our knowledge, prior research has not examined this
issue. Further, the introduction of monitoring effects into the analysis creates some tension in the
prediction that a firm’s cost of debt increases if it discloses a MW. Finally, this analysis also provides
evidence regarding (1) the argument that banks are effective delegated monitors for the debt market,
and (2) the importance of bank monitoring relative to monitoring by credit rating agencies.
A third benefit to examining the cost of debt is that we are able to compare our results to the
corresponding cost of equity results in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009). Based on this analysis, we are
able to offer several suggestions for future research. These suggestions involve comparing and
contrasting the effect of various monitoring agents on (1) the change in a firm’s cost of equity and
the disclosure of a MW, and (2) the change in a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of a MW.
Section II develops the hypotheses. Section III provides a description of the sample. Section IV
describes the primary test results. Section V compares these results to the cost of equity results in
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009). Section VI reports the results of additional analyses. Section VII
provides a summary of the major findings.
II. HYPOTHESES
Internal Control over Financial Reporting and the Cost of Debt
We have several reasons to expect that weak internal control over financial reporting is
associated with a higher cost of debt. For example, cost of debt factors in the likelihood of default.
At the same time, weak internal control over financial reporting leads to a reduction in the precision
of financial reporting numbers, which decreases the reliability of the information needed to assess
3 Debt is an important source of financing for many firms. For example, among our sample firms, long-term debt
as a percentage of equity is, on average, almost 60 percent.
4 See Botosan and Plumlee (2005) for a discussion of the measurement of the cost of equity, as well as a
comparison of different measures of the cost of equity.
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the likelihood of default (i.e., estimation risk increases). This decrease in reliability would cause
debt investors to charge a higher cost of debt to compensate for their decreased ability to accurately
assess the likelihood of default (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003). Similarly, since debt investors use
financial reporting numbers to determine compliance with debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo
1994), this decrease in reliability would lead debt investors to charge a higher cost of debt to
compensate for their decreased ability to determine this compliance.
Lambert et al. (2007) observe, ‘‘[W]hen accounting quality increases, however, managers steal
less, so more of the payoff goes to shareholders,’’ where payoff refers to a firm’s cash flows. This
observation suggests that weak internal control over financial reporting, which decreases
accounting quality, provides managers with more opportunities to misappropriate cash flows
(i.e., misappropriation risk increases). This increased misappropriation risk increases default risk,
thus increasing the cost of debt.
The disclosure of a MW in an initial Section 404 report indicates the potential for a material
misstatement in a firm’s financial statements due to weak internal control over financial reporting.
Thus, based on the preceding arguments, we predict that the disclosure of a MW in an initial
Section 404 report is associated, on average, with an increase in a firm’s cost of debt. The
hypothesis used to test this prediction is:
H1: Firms that initially disclose a MW under Section 404 experience a larger increase in their
cost of debt compared to firms with no such disclosure.
Monitoring Effects and the Cost of Debt
Although we predict that a firm’s cost of debt increases if it discloses a MW in an initial
Section 404 report, it is possible that this average prediction does not hold equally for firms that are
monitored compared to firms that are not monitored by credit rating agencies and/or banks. When
monitoring debt, a credit rating agency assesses the quality of a firm’s internal control over financial
reporting. This assessment is reflected in the credit rating assigned to the firm. Consistent with this
notion, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2005b) indicates that, for firms that report a Section 404
MW, rating actions are not needed in most cases, as the Moody’s rating already reflects Moody’s
impression of the control weaknesses that are eventually disclosed in a Section 404 report.
Based on the preceding, we expect that a firm’s credit rating provides the debt market with
indirect information about the quality of a firm’s internal control over financial reporting, thereby
reducing the importance of the information provided to the debt market in a Section 404 report.
This reduced importance should lead to a smaller increase in a firm’s cost of debt upon the
disclosure of a MW than the increase that would occur if no monitoring by credit rating agencies
existed. If the preceding is the case, then we expect:
H2a: The increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for firms
with unrated debt than for firms with rated debt.
Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985), among others, argue that banks serve as effective monitors
for the debt market because they have a comparative advantage in carrying out information search
and monitoring activities. For example, bankers have an ongoing relationship with a borrower,
allowing them access to information about a borrower that is not publicly available (Fama 1985).
Also, bankers find it easier to monitor a firm because other providers of corporate debt are more
dispersed; thus, monitoring by these other providers suffers from free-rider problems (Diamond
1984). Many empirical studies document support for the notion that banks serve as effective
delegated monitors (e.g., James 1987; Datta et al. 2000; Bharath et al. 2008; Altman et al. 2010).
Given the preceding, we argue that firms without bank loans exhibit a larger increase in their
cost of debt following the disclosure of a MW in an initial Section 404 report than firms with bank
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loans. If a bank makes a loan to a given firm, the bank would assess the quality of the firm’s internal
control over financial reporting; this assessment would be reflected in the interest rate on the loan.
In other words, banks would price protect against internal control over financial reporting problems.
Further, a firm that has bank loans must disclose information about the terms of these loans in Form
10-K. Also, there are databases that provide detailed information about the terms of a firm’s bank
loan agreements (e.g., DealScan). This information would provide the debt market with indirect
information about the quality of a firm’s internal control over financial reporting, thereby reducing
the importance of the information provided in a Section 404 report.
Further, the debt market could use this information to mimic the behavior of banks and also
price protect against internal control over financial reporting problems, thereby reducing (relative to
firms not subject to bank monitoring) the reaction of the cost of debt to the disclosure of a MW.5
Based on the preceding arguments, we expect:
H2b: The increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for firms
that are not subject to bank monitoring than for firms that are subject to bank
monitoring.
We initially test H2a and H2b separately. We then test these hypotheses jointly to determine if
the monitoring effect of credit rating agencies and that of banks each has its own incremental effect
on the relationship between the cost of debt and the disclosure of a MW, as opposed to one effect
subsuming the other.
Delinquent Filers and the Cost of Debt
Ogneva et al. (2007) find that the effect of Section 404 on the cost of equity is strongest for
delinquent filers. Additionally, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2005a, 1–2) views a delay in filing
a Section 404 report as indicating the most serious internal control over financial reporting
problems for the following reasons:
 Late filers may heighten uncertainty about the nature and extent of their control deficiencies
while the company and its auditor complete their evaluation of the company’s controls.
This uncertainty, in turn, raises questions about the reliability of the company’s financial
data, particularly un-audited data, the ultimate timing of filing reports with the SEC, and the
nature of the company’s plan to remediate control problems.
Regarding liquidity, later filers may:
 Temporarily lose access to the public capital markets because their SEC filings are
‘‘delinquent’’;
 Also miss the deadline for filing audited financial statements, which, in turn, could cause
uncertainty among market participants and affect the amount and terms of capital available
to the company; and
 Violate covenants in credit agreements and/or indentures. A common covenant requires
timely filing of financial data with the SEC.
Based on the preceding, we test the following hypothesis:
H3: Firms that delay filing an initial Section 404 report experience an increase in their cost of
debt relative to timely filers.
5 If the debt market did not behave in this manner, then it is possible that the cost of debt would significantly
increase when a firm that a bank is supposed to be monitoring discloses a MW in an initial Section 404 report.
However, our results suggest that this is not the case.
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The Ex Ante Probability of Reporting a MW and the Cost of Debt
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) document that the increase in the cost of equity for firms with a
low ex ante probability of reporting a MW is greater than the increase for high-probability firms
when a Section 302 material weakness (hereafter, Section 302 MW) or a Section 404 MW is
disclosed.6 This finding is consistent with the notion that the equity market is more surprised when
a firm with a low ex ante probability of reporting a MW actually reveals a MW than when this
occurs for a high ex ante probability firm. Based on this evidence, we expect:
H4: The increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for low ex
ante probability of reporting MW firms than for high ex ante probability firms.
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The initial sample of Section 404 disclosures consists of 4,536 firm-years identified as
reporting or not reporting a Section 404 MW in their Form 10-K filings between November 3,
2004, and March 3, 2006, according to the Audit Analytics Internal Controls (hereafter, Audit
Analytics) database. We eliminate firm-years with erroneous or duplicate CIK codes (these are the
firm-identifier codes that Audit Analytics uses), duplicate or triplicate firm-years (e.g., where a firm
disclosed internal control status updates in a subsequent year’s Form 10-K), and firm-years not in
the Compustat database. After applying these screens, we are left with 3,640 (3,087 non-MW and
553 MW) unique firms making an initial Section 404 disclosure. The firms come from a broad
range of industries. For example, only four two-digit SIC industries comprise more than 5 percent
of the firms, with the greatest concentration in SIC 60 (Depository Institutions, 10.93 percent of
firms) and SIC 73 (Business Services, 10.27 percent of firms).
To obtain yield data, we use the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) fixed income securities transaction data. All brokers/
dealers who are NASD members have an obligation to report transactions in corporate debt
instruments via the TRACE system. TRACE should provide a relatively complete picture of trading
in corporate debt instruments. For example, by the time of our sample period, (1) ‘‘As a general
rule, the vast majority of dollar denominated corporate debt instruments must be reported to
TRACE’’ (NASD 2004, 4), and (2) ‘‘approximately 99% of all transactions and 95% of par value in
the TRACE-eligible securities market are disseminated immediately’’ (SEC 2005, 5).7 Further, the
data collected and disseminated on these transactions would cover the majority of all transactions in
corporate bonds because ‘‘[m]ost corporate bonds trade in the over-the-counter (OTC) market . . .
The OTC market is much larger than the exchange markets, and the vast majority of bond
transactions, even those involving exchange-listed issues, take place in this market’’ (Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association [SIFMA] 2009, 1).
6 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) use both Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures in their analysis. Section 302,
which was finalized and implemented on August 29, 2002, requires management to certify in quarterly and
annual reports that disclosure control processes and procedures have been designed and implemented, and to
conclude on the effectiveness of disclosure controls. Both Sections 302 and 404 require the disclosure of
material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Under Section 302, the disclosure is the
responsibility of management, while under Section 404, the disclosure is the responsibility of the firm’s
independent auditor, as well as management.
7 For example, in 2004 TRACE was collecting data on secondary over-the-counter market transactions for
approximately 23,000 publicly traded corporate bond issues, including investment-grade debt, high-yield debt,
and unrated debt, and on a typical day $20 billion par value of corporate bonds turned over in approximately
25,000 transactions (NASD 2004). In 2005, transactions not reported immediately were subject to a maximum
ten-business-day reporting delay, except for trades of Rule 144A securities, which were not disseminated
because of the limited transferability and tradability of securities sold pursuant to Rule 144A (SEC 2005).
1136 Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, and Wilkins
The Accounting Review
July 2011
TRACE provides transaction-specific information, including price and yield. Using this data,
we calculate the transaction-specific credit spread as yield to maturity, or YTM, on a given
corporate debt instrument transaction minus YTM (obtained from Federal Reserve Board [2006])
on a Treasury security matched on time to maturity.8
We remove from the sample firms with missing required data, and four firms for which the
absolute value of the test variable DDefaultRisk exceeds 400 percent.9 We also remove 43 firms that
report a Section 302 MW prior to their initial Section 404 report.10,11 These procedures yield a
sample of 577 (531 non-MW and 46 MW) firms. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for these
firms.
Similar to previous studies, MW firms are smaller, less profitable, and more distressed than
non-MW firms.12 Also, for both MW and non-MW firms, there is an increase in credit spreads in
the time period following the initial Section 404 report filing date, indicating that our tests should
control for this general increase in credit spreads over the test period. Moreover, MW firms have a
higher pre-report credit spread than non-MW firms, suggesting that the debt market, at least
partially, can anticipate which firms are more likely to disclose a MW. This last observation
indicates that our tests should control for pre-report credit spreads.
Finally, if we partition the Spread (pre) data in Table 1 by bank monitoring status, we find that,
for bank-monitored firms over days [45, 3] relative to the initial Section 404 report filing date,
the mean spread for MW firms in excess of the mean spread for non-MW firms equals 3.22 percent.
For firms not subject to bank monitoring, the corresponding difference is 1.69 percent. Finally,
consistent with the notion that banks serve as effective monitors and that the debt market mimics
bank behavior, the difference between 3.22 percent and 1.69 percent is marginally significant (p =
0.062).
IV. TEST DESIGN AND RESULTS
Test of H1: Internal Control Disclosures and the Cost of Debt
Test Design
To examine if firms that initially disclose a Section 404 MW experience an increase in their
cost of debt relative to firms with no such disclosure, we estimate Model (1):13
8 In these calculations, to eliminate outliers, we delete the top and bottom 1 percent of transaction-specific yield
observations.
9 Our conclusions do not change if we estimate our models after setting DDefaultRisk for these four firms equal to
the next most extreme value of DDefaultRisk observed in the distribution of DDefaultRisk.
10 These firms are removed because (1) the disclosure of a prior Section 302 MW may preempt any information
provided by the disclosure of a MW in an initial Section 404 report, and (2) we do not want firms that disclose a
prior Section 302 MW, but disclose no MW in an initial Section 404 report, included in the sample because the
remediation of a material weakness is not the primary interest of our study.
11 Approximately 85 percent of our sample firms have complete data on debt seniority. We do not want to reduce
the sample size for our regression tests further by requiring data on debt seniority. If we estimate our models after
adding the variable Seniority, coded 1 for firms that have trades in only senior/senior secured debt instruments,
and 0 for firms that either have trades in at least some less senior debt instruments or have missing seniority data,
the estimated coefficient on Seniority is negative and not significant at conventional levels (most significant p =
0.115). The only notable change in our results is that the estimated coefficient on MW in Model (1) is positive at
p = 0.120 (rather than p = 0.099). Based on this analysis, we conclude that the seniority of debt does not appear
to have an influence on our test results.
12 The previous studies that we refer to here are Ge and McVay (2005), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007, 2009), Doyle
et al. (2007), Ogneva et al. (2007), Beneish et al. (2008), Hogan and Wilkins (2008), Crabtree et al. (2009),
Elbannan (2009), and Kim et al. (2011).
13 Appendix A summarizes the data sources used to calculate model variables.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
531 Non-MW Firms 46 MW Firms
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Yield (pre) 4.982 4.822 2.230 7.788* 6.042* 6.784
Yield (post) 5.520 5.260 2.641 8.539* 6.529* 6.844
Spread (pre) 1.308 1.011 2.240 4.050* 2.487* 6.750
Spread (post) 1.676 1.311 2.693 4.737* 2.634* 6.811
DefaultRisk (pre) 1.800 1.841 2.039 0.578* 0.691* 2.045
DefaultRisk (post) 1.431 1.652 1.685 0.415* 0.248* 2.010
Assets (pre) 7760.93 2878.48 14151.94 4427.13* 1317.92* 7560.75
Assets (post) 7915.96 2978.40 14411.51 4332.26* 1298.93* 7353.87
CFO (pre) 0.054 0.060 0.078 0.016* 0.016* 0.055
CFO (post) 0.086 0.092 0.101 0.037* 0.041* 0.082
Leverage (pre) 0.319 0.271 0.203 0.299 0.290 0.169
Leverage (post) 0.315 0.266 0.208 0.310 0.284 0.171
CFVol (pre) 0.043 0.036 0.031 0.045 0.033 0.037
CFVol (post) 0.045 0.038 0.032 0.044 0.036 0.036
TrsYTM (pre) 3.674 3.754 0.640 3.738 3.900 0.712
TrsYTM (post) 3.844 3.933 0.604 3.802 3.917 0.645
Restructure (pre) 0.311 0 0.463 0.478* 0 0.505
Restructure (post) 0.382 0 0.486 0.478 0 0.505
WriteDown (pre) 0.130 0 0.337 0.152 0 0.363
WriteDown (post) 0.196 0 0.397 0.304 0 0.465
M&A (pre) 0.043 0 0.204 0.022 0 0.147
M&A (post) 0.055 0 0.227 0.022 0 0.147
Restate (pre) 0.122 0 0.327 0.111 0 0.318
Restate (post) 0.127 0 0.334 0.178 0 0.387
* Indicates that the ‘‘531 Non-MW Firms’’ value is significantly different from the ‘‘46 MW Firms’’ value at the two-
tailed 5 percent level or better, based on a t-test of difference in means or a Wilcoxon two-sample test for medians.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 531 sample firms that do not report a MW and the 46 sample firms that do
report a MW in an initial Section 404 report.
Variable Definitions:
Yield (pre) = mean (for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues) YTM over days [45, 3] relative to the
initial Section 404 report filing date;
Yield (post) = mean (for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues) YTM over days [þ3, þ45];
Spread (pre) = mean (for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues) credit spread over days [45, 3], where
the credit spread for each trade is YTM on the relevant debt issue minus YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury
security;
Spread (post) = mean (for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues) credit spread over days [þ3, þ45];
DefaultRisk = score from the bankruptcy model of Ohlson (1980);
Assets = total assets in $ millions;
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets;
Leverage = long-term debt scaled by total assets;
CFVol = standard deviation over the last 20 quarters of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets;
For each sample firm i, TrsYTMi (pre) = the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security’’ used to
calculate Spreadi over days [45, 3], and TrsYTMi (post) = the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity
Treasury security’’ used to calculate Spreadi over days [þ3, þ45]; and
Restructure (WriteDown, M&A, Restate) = an indicator variable equal to 1 if restructuring (writedown, M&A,
restatement) activity occurs in a given period, and 0 otherwise.
(continued on next page)
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DSpread = a0 þ b0MW þ b1DDefaultRisk þ b2DSize þ b3DCFO
þ b4DLeverage þ b5DCFVol þ b6DTrsYTM þ b7DRestructure
þ b8DWriteDown þ b9DM&A þ b10DRestate þ e: ð1Þ
Model (1) employs a difference-in-differences test design that compares each MW and non-MW
firm to itself by measuring the change in a firm’s credit spread around an initial Section 404 report
(DSpread) as the credit spread following the report minus the credit spread preceding the report. To
calculate DSpread, we first identify all TRACE trades in a firm’s debt instruments that occur over
days [45, 3] and days [þ3, þ45] relative to the initial Section 404 report filing date. For each
trade, we measure the credit spread as YTM on the relevant debt issue minus YTM on a matched-
by-maturity Treasury security. We then calculate DSpread for each firm as the mean (for all firm-
specific trades) credit spread over days [þ3, þ45] minus the mean credit spread over days [45,
3].14
By measuring DSpread as the credit spread following minus the credit spread preceding an
initial Section 404 report, we attempt to control for observable firm characteristics that could be
used to predict a MW, and thus impact the response of the credit spread to the information in an
initial Section 404 report. In particular, DSpread takes into account the credit spread before a firm
files an initial Section 404 report, which includes the effect of these firm characteristics with regards
to the debt market’s anticipation of how likely it is that a firm will report a MW.
The test design also uses the indicator variable MW, set equal to 1 if a firm discloses a MW in
an initial Section 404 report, and 0 otherwise, to compare DSpread of MW firms to DSpread of
non-MW firms. The use of the variable MW allows non-MW firms to act as a control for the general
increase in credit spreads over the test period that we observe in Table 1. H1 predicts that the
estimated coefficient on MW is positive.
Model (1) includes controls for factors that previous research finds to influence the cost of
debt. We measure the relevant control variables using the change in value (D) during the fourth
TABLE 1 (continued)
For DefaultRisk, Assets, CFO, and Leverage, (pre) refers to value for Q3 and (post) refers to value for Q4, where Q4 is
the fourth quarter of the fiscal year that is reported on in a firm’s initial Section 404 report and Q3 is the preceding
quarter. For CFVol, (pre) refers to the last 20 quarters ending in Q3, and (post) refers to the last 20 quarters ending
in Q4. For Restructure, WriteDown, and M&A, (pre) refers to restructuring, writedown, and M&A activity,
respectively, during Q3, and (post) refers to this activity during Q4. For Restate, due to data constraints, (pre) refers
to restatement activity during FY1, and (post) refers to this activity during FY, where FY is the fiscal year that is
reported on in a firm’s initial Section 404 report.
The sample of firms filing an initial Section 404 report consists of firms that (1) provide a Section 404 report in their
Form 10-K filings made between November 3, 2004, and March 3, 2006, according to the Audit Analytics Internal
Controls database, after eliminating firm-years with erroneous or duplicate CIK codes (these are the firm-identifier
codes that Audit Analytics uses) and duplicate or triplicate firm-years (e.g., where a firm disclosed internal control
status updates in a subsequent year’s Form 10-K), and (2) have all the data needed to estimate our regression
models. We remove from the sample 43 firms that report a Section 302 material weakness prior to their initial
Section 404 report and four firms for which the absolute value of the test variable DDefaultRisk (see Table 2)
exceeds 400 percent.
14 DSpread averages (1) multiple trades in a firm’s individual debt instruments during a window, and (2) trades in
more than one of a firm’s debt instruments during a window. In the sample, the mean number of trades in a firm’s
debt instruments in days [45, 3] ([þ3, þ45]) is 210 (204); the median number of trades is 45 (51); and
approximately one-third of firms have 20 (27) or fewer trades, while approximately one-third have 100 (110) or
more trades. Also, in both windows, the mean (median) number of debt instruments per firm that trade in a
window is 2.8 (2.0); and more than 69 percent (96 percent) of firms have one or two (ten or fewer) debt
instruments that trade in a window.
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quarter of the fiscal year that is reported on in a firm’s initial Section 404 report. Measuring the
control variables in this manner helps to alleviate the concern that the reaction of a firm’s credit
spread to the release of its Form 10-K may be a response to the financial information in the Form
10-K rather than the information in the Section 404 report that is included in the Form 10-K.
To control for an expected positive relationship between the default risk of a firm’s debt and its
cost of debt, we use the variable DDefaultRisk, where DefaultRisk is a firm’s score from the
bankruptcy model of Ohlson (1980).15 Based on evidence in Begley et al. (1996) and following the
procedure in Mansi et al. (2004), we calculate DefaultRisk for each firm using the model
coefficients provided by Ohlson (1980). We predict that the estimated coefficient on DDefaultRisk
is positive.
Previous studies often include controls for firm size, profitability, leverage, and cash flow
volatility in models that estimate a firm’s cost of debt (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994; Sengupta
1998; Kim et al. 2011). For this reason, Model (1) includes the variables DSize (change in the log of
total assets), DCFO (change in cash flow from operations scaled by total assets), DLeverage
(change in long-term debt scaled by total assets), and DCFVol (change in the standard deviation
over the last 20 quarters of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets).16,17 Based on the
results of the studies cited above, we predict that the estimated coefficients on DSize and DCFO are
negative, and the estimated coefficients on DLeverage and DCFVol are positive.
The finance literature documents, theoretically and empirically, that changes in credit spreads are
negatively associated with changes in Treasury rates, especially in the short run (e.g., Longstaff and
Schwartz 1995; Duffee 1998; Neal et al. 2001). Based on this evidence, Model (1) includes the
variable DTrsYTM. For each sample firm i, DTrsYTMi is equal to the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-
by-maturity Treasury security’’ used to calculate Spreadi over days [þ3,þ45] minus the mean of all
‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security’’ used to calculate Spreadi over days [45,3].
Based on the studies cited above, we predict that the estimated coefficient on DTrsYTM is negative.
To control for changes in a firm’s financial health, Model (1) includes controls for change in
the existence of restructuring, writedown, M&A, and/or restatement activity that would be
disclosed in the Form 10-K for the fiscal year of a firm’s initial Section 404 report.18 We do not
predict a sign for the estimated coefficients on DRestructure or DWriteDown because
restructuring and writedown activity could be bad news (e.g., a firm is having problems) or
good news (e.g., a firm is taking action to resolve its problems). Similarly, we do not predict a
sign for the estimated coefficient on DM&A because M&A activity could be bad news (e.g., a
firm is overpaying) or good news (e.g., a firm is making a sensible acquisition). Finally, we
15 The factors in the model are log of assets, working capital scaled by assets, total liabilities scaled by total assets,
current liabilities scaled by current assets, net income scaled by assets, operating cash flows scaled by liabilities,
change in net income scaled by the sum of the absolute values of the prior two years’ net income, and two
indicator variables. The indicator variables identify (1) firms with negative earnings in the current and previous
year, and (2) firms with negative owner’s equity in the current year. If we replace DDefaultRisk with D for each
of the individual factors included in the bankruptcy model of Ohlson (1980), the only notable change in our
results is that the estimated coefficient on MW in Model (1) is now positive at p = 0.153 (rather than p = 0.099).
16 If we use a measure of DCFO that attempts to control for seasonality (i.e., DCFO as currently measured minus
DCFO for the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year that is reported on in a firm’s initial Section 404 report), it is
significantly correlated with DCFO (p = 0.001) and there is no notable change in our results.
17 We do not use change in earnings to measure change in profitability because, as a result of earnings
announcements made prior to the release of the Form 10-K, it is likely that credit spreads would have already
reacted to the information in change in earnings during the days [45, 3] window. If we replace DCFO with
‘‘actual annual EPS reported by I/B/E/S minus the most recent (but no more recent than the end of the third
quarter) mean I/B/E/S forecast for annual EPS,’’ there is no notable change in our results.
18 DRestructure, DWriteDown, DM&A, and DRestate are coded as 1, 0, or 1, as described in Table 2.
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predict that the estimated coefficient on DRestate is positive because a restatement indicates weak
internal control over financial reporting.
Test Results
As reported in Table 2, when we estimate Model (1), the coefficient on MW is positive (p =
0.099).19 This result provides marginal support for H1 that the disclosure of a MW in an initial
Section 404 report is associated with an increase in a firm’s cost of debt.20 However, this initial
result is an average result. It does not provide evidence as to whether the effect of disclosing a MW
on the cost of debt holds equally for firms that are monitored and firms that are not monitored by
credit rating agencies and/or banks. Therefore, we next explore the impact of monitoring.
Tests of H2a and H2b: Monitoring Effects
Test Design
To examine the monitoring hypotheses, which predict that the evidence supporting H1 is
stronger for firms that are not monitored by credit rating agencies and/or banks compared to firms
that are monitored, we estimate Model (2):
DSpread = a0 þ b0MW þ b1Monitored þ b2MW Monitored þ bnModel 1 Controlsþ e: ð2Þ
Model (2) employs a difference in difference-in-differences test design. The innovation in Model
(2) is that the coefficient b2 tests the difference between (1) the difference in DSpread between MW
and non-MW firms for monitored firms, and (2) the difference in DSpread between MW and non-
MW firms for unmonitored firms. This innovation allows us to test whether the evidence supporting
H1 is stronger for unmonitored firms. The monitoring hypotheses predict that the estimated
coefficient b2 is negative.
Test Results for Monitoring by Credit Rating Agencies
To test the effect of monitoring by credit rating agencies, we measure Monitored using an
indicator variable Rated, set equal to 1 if a firm’s debt is rated by S&P and/or Moody’s, and 0
otherwise. To determine if S&P rates a firm’s debt, we use the S&P credit rating variable available
in Compustat. Further, to determine if Moody’s rates a firm’s debt, we consult the Mergent Bond
Record as of January 2005 (Mergent Inc. 2005), which lists debt issues that Moody’s rates.
In our sample of 577 firms, there are 489 firms with rated debt and 88 firms with unrated
debt.21 Among the 489 rated firms, there are 456 non-MW and 33 MW firms. Among the 88
unrated firms, there are 75 non-MW and 13 MW firms. As reported in Table 3, Panel A, when we
estimate Model (2) using Rated, the coefficient b2 is negative (p = 0.039), supporting H2a that the
19 We report p-values of 0.001 or better as p = 0.001. Reported p-values are based on one-tailed tests. In our tests
reported in Tables 2 through 6, the significant results for the control variables with a predicted sign are that the
estimated coefficient on DCFO is negative (p = 0.001), the estimated coefficient on DCFVol is positive (between
p = 0.003 and p = 0.062), and the estimated coefficient on DTrsYTM is negative (between p = 0.001 and p =
0.011).
20 Consistent with this finding, in univariate tests, mean DSpread for MW firms (non-MW firms) is 0.687 (0.368),
and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of firms is positive and statistically significant (p =
0.047).
21 Choi and Richardson (2010), in Panel A of Table 2, report that among their 1,566 sample firms with publicly
traded bonds, 266 firms (16.99 percent) are unrated, which is close to our finding that 15.25 percent of our
sample firms are unrated.
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increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for firms with unrated
debt than for firms with rated debt.
Next, we assess the impact of reporting a MW on DSpread for (1) only firms with rated debt,
and (2) only firms with unrated debt. In terms of Model (2), the relevant tests are based on (1) the
sum of the estimated coefficients b0þb2 for firms with rated debt, and (2) the estimated coefficient
b0 for firms with unrated debt. As reported in Table 3, Panel A, the sum of the estimated
TABLE 2
Analysis of the Change in a Firm’s Credit Spread following an Initial Section 404 Report
DSpread = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.717 0.001
MW b0 þ 0.242 0.099
DDefaultRisk b1 þ 0.051 0.782
DSize b2  0.369 0.787
DCFO b3  6.025 0.001
DLeverage b4 þ 0.338 0.365
DCFVol b5 þ 19.192 0.005
DTrsYTM b6  1.084 0.001
DRestructure b7 0.234 0.107
DWriteDown b8 0.343 0.033
DM&A b9 0.053 0.457
DRestate b10 þ 0.143 0.899
Adjusted R2 0.080
a p-values are one-tailed, and p = 0.001 indicates that p is less than or equal to 0.001. p-values exceeding 0.500 indicate
that the sign of an estimated coefficient is not in the predicted direction.
The variables (followed by predicted signs) in the OLS regression model reported in this table are as follows.
Dependent variable: The change in a firm’s credit spread around an initial Section 404 report (DSpread), computed as
follows. We measure the credit spread for individual trades in a firm’s debt instruments as YTM on the relevant debt
issue minus YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security. We calculate the mean pre- (post-) report credit spread
for each firm (i.e., Spread) as the mean credit spread for all TRACE-reported trades occurring over days [45,3] ([þ3,
þ45]) relative to the initial Section 404 report filing date. We calculate the change in credit spread for each firm as its
mean post-report credit spread minus its mean pre-report credit spread.
RHS variables:
MW = 1 if a firm discloses a MW in an initial Section 404 report, and 0 otherwise;
DDefaultRisk = change in the score from the bankruptcy model of Ohlson (1980);
DSize = change in the log of total assets;
DCFO = change in cash flow from operations scaled by total assets;
DLeverage = change in long-term debt scaled by total assets;
DCFVol = change in standard deviation over the last 20 quarters of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets,
where change in these ‘‘D variables’’ is change in value during the fourth quarter of the fiscal year that is reported on
in a firm’s initial Section 404 report (Q4);
For each sample firm i, DTrsYTMi = the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security’’ used to
calculate Spreadi over days [þ3, þ45] minus the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security’’
used to calculate Spreadi over days [45, 3];
DRestructure = 1 if restructuring activity occurs in Q4 but not in the preceding quarter, Q3 (equal to1 if restructuring
activity occurs in Q3 but not in Q4; equal to 0 if restructuring activity occurs in both Q3 and Q4 or if no
restructuring activity occurs in either Q3 or Q4); and
DWriteDown, DM&A, and DRestate are measured in a manner similar to DRestructure to reflect changes in writedown,
M&A, and restatement activity, respectively. Due to data constraints, DRestate is measured for the fiscal year
(rather than Q4) that is reported on in a firm’s initial Section 404 report.
The construction of the sample of 577 (531 non-MW and 46 MW) firms is described in Table 1.
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TABLE 3
Analysis of the Change in a Firm’s Credit Spread Following an Initial Section 404 Report
with Independent Controls for Monitoring
Panel A: Control for Monitoring by Credit Rating Agencies
DSpread = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.565 0.001
MW b0 þ 0.798 0.014
Rated b1 0.193 0.114
MW  Rated b2  0.742 0.039
DDefaultRisk b3 þ 0.060 0.818
DSize b4  0.289 0.731
DCFO b5  6.307 0.001
DLeverage b6 þ 0.410 0.340
DCFVol b7 þ 20.879 0.003
DTrsYTM b8  1.098 0.001
DRestructure b9 0.228 0.112
DWriteDown b10 0.339 0.034
DM&A b11 0.075 0.439
DRestate b12 þ 0.155 0.917
Adjusted R2 0.083
Sum of coefficients
MW þ MW  Rated (b0 þ b2) þ 0.056 0.400
Panel B: Control for Monitoring by Banks
DSpread = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.796 0.001
MW b0 þ 1.434 0.001
Bank b1 0.119 0.235
MW  Bank b2  1.744 0.001
DDefaultRisk b3 þ 0.038 0.722
DSize b4  0.190 0.662
DCFO b5  5.079 0.001
DLeverage b6 þ 0.211 0.586
DCFVol b7 þ 15.915 0.016
DTrsYTM b8  1.111 0.001
DRestructure b9 0.270 0.072
DWriteDown b10 0.283 0.062
DM&A b11 0.060 0.451
DRestate b12 þ 0.116 0.854
Adjusted R2 0.114
Sum of coefficients
MW þ MW  Bank (b0 þ b2) þ 0.310 0.922
a p-values are one-tailed, and p = 0.001 indicates that p is less than or equal to 0.001. p-values exceeding 0.500 indicate
that the sign of an estimated coefficient is not in the predicted direction.
The variables (followed by predicted signs) in the OLS regression models reported in this table are as follows:
Dependent Variable: The change in a firm’s credit spread around an initial Section 404 report (DSpread) is defined in
Table 2.
(continued on next page)
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coefficients b0 þ b2 is positive but not statistically significant (p = 0.400), and the estimated
coefficient b0 is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.014). These results provide further
support for H2a.22 Initially, these findings suggest that monitoring by credit rating agencies is
effective at capturing much of the information provided to the debt market in an initial Section 404
report.
Test Results for Monitoring by Banks
We now turn to tests of the bank-monitoring hypothesis. To test the effect of monitoring by
banks, we measure Monitored using an indicator variable Bank. To code Bank, we first consult the
DealScan database to identify sample firms that have a new or revised bank loan agreement in any
year from 1988 (the earliest DealScan record for a sample firm) through 2005. We code these firms
Bank = 1 (i.e., subject to bank monitoring).23 We then code the remaining sample firms Bank = 0.
In our sample of 577 firms, there are 500 firms that are coded Bank = 1 (i.e., subject to bank
monitoring) and 77 firms that are coded Bank = 0. Among the 500 bank-monitored firms, there are
468 non-MW and 32 MW firms. Among the 77 non-bank-monitored firms, there are 63 non-MW
and 14 MW firms. Referring to Table 3, Panel B, in the estimate of Model (2) using Bank, the
coefficient b2 is significantly negative (p = 0.001). Thus, the data provide support for H2b that the
increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for firms that are not
subject to bank monitoring than for firms that are subject to bank monitoring.
Next, we assess the impact of reporting a MW on DSpread for (1) only bank-monitored firms,
and (2) only firms not subject to bank monitoring. As reported in Table 3, Panel B, in this analysis
the sum of the estimated coefficients b0þ b2 is negative and the estimated coefficient b0 is positive
and statistically significant (p = 0.001). These results provide further support for H2b.24
TABLE 3 (continued)
RHS variables:
Panel A: Rated = 1 if a firm’s debt is rated by S&P and/or Moody’s (489 firms: 456 are non-MW firms and 33 are MW
firms), and 0 otherwise (88 firms: 75 are non-MW firms and 13 are MW firms).
Panel B: Bank = 1 if a firm has a new or revised bank loan agreement in any year from 1988 to 2005 (500 firms: 468 are
non-MW firms and 32 are MW firms), and 0 otherwise (77 firms: 63 are non-MW firms and 14 are MW firms).
Panels A and B: MW, DDefaultRisk, DSize, DCFO, DLeverage, DCFVol, DTrsYTM, DRestructure, DWriteDown,
DM&A, and DRestate are defined in Table 2.
The construction of the sample of 577 (531 non-MW and 46 MW) firms is described in Table 1.
22 Univariate tests highlight the importance of monitoring by credit rating agencies. For rated firms, mean DSpread
for MW firms (non-MW firms) is 0.453 (0.351), and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of
firms is positive but not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.305). For unrated firms, mean DSpread for MW
firms (non-MW firms) is 1.281 (0.476), and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of firms is
marginally significant (p = 0.067).
23 The DealScan database is compiled using information from SEC filings and self-reported information from
participating banks. Some loan packages or deals reported by DealScan can have several facilities for the same
borrower. We do not break down such loan packages or deals into individual facilities because we are using
DealScan to identify the existence of a new or revised bank loan agreement, which could be a single facility, a
loan package, or a deal with several individual facilities. Also, it is not necessarily the case that a new or revised
bank loan agreement entered into prior to the initial Section 404 report filing date will still be in effect when the
report is filed; we analyze this issue in detail in Section VI.
24 Univariate tests highlight the importance of bank monitoring. For bank-monitored firms, mean DSpread for MW
firms (non-MW firms) is 0.079 (0.326), and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of firms is
negative. For firms not subject to bank monitoring, mean DSpread for MW firms (non-MW firms) is 2.076
(0.681), and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of firms is positive and statistically
significant (p = 0.014).
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The preceding findings support both the credit rating agency and the bank-monitoring
hypotheses. However, a test is still required to assess whether each of the monitoring effects
documented so far has an incremental effect on the relationship between the change in a firm’s
credit spread and the disclosure of a MW. Therefore, we next test the joint effects of monitoring by
credit rating agencies and banks.
Test Results for the Joint Effects of Monitoring
In this section, we test H2a and H2b jointly, using Model (3):
DSpread = a0 þ b0MW þ b1Rated þ b2MW  Rated þ b3Bank þ b4MW  Bank
þ b5Rated  Bank þ b6MW  Rated  Bank þ bnModel 1 Controls þ e: ð3Þ
Model (3) allows us to test the difference between (1) the difference in DSpread between MW and
non-MW firms that have rated debt and are subject to bank monitoring (i.e., the ‘‘most monitored’’
firms), and (2) the difference in DSpread between MW and non-MW firms that have unrated debt
and are not subject to bank monitoring (i.e., the ‘‘least monitored’’ firms). To compare the ‘‘most
monitored’’ and the ‘‘least monitored’’ firms, we test the sum of the estimated coefficients b2, b4,
and b6. The monitoring hypotheses predict that the sum of these coefficients is negative. As
reported in Table 4, this prediction is supported (p = 0.002).25
Model (3) also allows us to test whether the monitoring effect of credit rating agencies and that of
banks each has its own incremental effect on the relationship between the change in a firm’s credit
spread and the disclosure of a MW, as opposed to one effect subsuming the other.26 In our sample,
there are 454 firms monitored by both credit rating agencies and banks, 35 firms monitored only by
credit rating agencies, 46 firms monitored only by banks, and 42 firms monitored by neither.27 The
relevant tests, predictions, and results (reported in Table 4) comparing these subgroups are as follows:
 For bank-monitored firms, is there a significant difference between (1) the difference in
DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for rated firms, and (2) the difference in
DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for unrated firms? Relevant prediction (H2a):
the sum of the estimated coefficients b2 and b6 is negative. Result: the data fail to support
this prediction (p = 0.261).
 For firms not subject to bank monitoring, is there a significant difference between (1) the
difference in DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for rated firms, and (2) the
difference in DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for unrated firms? Relevant
prediction (H2a): the estimated coefficient b2 is negative. Result: the data fail to support
this prediction (i.e., the estimated coefficient b2 is positive).
25 Univariate tests highlight the importance of monitoring. For firms that have rated debt and are subject to bank
monitoring, mean DSpread for MW firms (non-MW firms) is 0.038 (0.335), and the difference in mean DSpread
between the two groups of firms is negative. For firms that have unrated debt and are not subject to bank
monitoring, mean DSpread for MW firms (non-MW firms) is 1.893 (0.774), and the difference in mean DSpread
between the two groups of firms is positive and marginally significant (p = 0.084).
26 For example, if a firm is both rated and subject to bank monitoring, it is possible that the contribution of this firm
to the significant ‘‘monitoring matters’’ results could be caused by the fact that the firm is rated, by the fact that
the firm is bank-monitored, or by both. In other words, when we measure Monitored in Model (2) using the
indicator variable Rated (Bank), Bank (Rated) may be a correlated omitted variable. Model (3) attempts to get at
this type of issue.
27 Among the 454 firms monitored by both credit rating agencies and banks, there are 427 non-MW and 27 MW
firms. Among the 35 firms monitored only by credit rating agencies, there are 29 non-MW and six MW firms.
Among the 46 firms monitored only by banks, there are 41 non-MW and five MW firms. Among the 42 firms
monitored by neither, there are 34 non-MW and eight MW firms. In Section VII, we discuss the fact that some of
the MW sample cells used in these joint tests are quite small.
Internal Control Disclosures, Monitoring, and the Cost of Debt 1145
The Accounting Review
July 2011
 For rated firms, is there a significant difference between (1) the difference in DSpread
between MW and non-MW firms for bank-monitored firms, and (2) the difference in
DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for firms not subject to bank monitoring?
Relevant prediction (H2b): the sum of the estimated coefficients b4 and b6 is negative.
Result: the data provide strong support for this prediction (p = 0.001).
 For unrated firms, is there a significant difference between (1) the difference in DSpread
between MW and non-MW firms for bank-monitored firms, and (2) the difference in
DSpread between MW and non-MW firms for firms not subject to bank monitoring?
Relevant prediction (H2b): the estimated coefficient b4 is negative. Result: the data provide
marginal support for this prediction (p = 0.059).
The preceding tests suggest that bank monitoring subsumes monitoring by credit rating
agencies with regards to the post-report response of credit spread to the disclosure of a MW in an
TABLE 4
Analysis of the Change in a Firm’s Credit Spread Following an Initial Section 404 Report
with Joint Controls for Monitoring
DSpread = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.781 0.001
MW b0 1.161 0.007
Rated b1 0.038 0.451
MW  Rated b2  0.612 0.806
Bank b3 0.349 0.107
MW  Bank b4  1.132 0.059
Rated  Bank b5 0.249 0.244
MW  Rated  Bank b6 0.998 0.143
DDefaultRisk b7 þ 0.053 0.790
DSize b8  0.229 0.690
DCFO b9  5.342 0.001
DLeverage b10 þ 0.000 0.500
DCFVol b11 þ 16.509 0.015
DTrsYTM b12  1.143 0.001
DRestructure b13 0.281 0.065
DWriteDown b14 0.274 0.068
DM&A b15 0.095 0.422
DRestate b16 þ 0.112 0.845
Adjusted R2 0.113
Sums of coefficients
MW  Rated þ MW  Bank þ MW  Rated  Bank (b2 þ b4 þ b6)  1.518 0.002
MW  Rated þ MW  Rated  Bank (b2 þ b6)  0.386 0.261
MW  Bank þ MW  Rated  Bank (b4 þ b6)  2.130 0.001
a p-values are one-tailed, and p = 0.001 indicates that p is less than or equal to 0.001. p-values exceeding 0.500 indicate
that the sign of an estimated coefficient is not in the predicted direction.
The variables (followed by predicted signs) in the OLS regression model reported in this table are as follows:
Dependent variable: The change in a firm’s credit spread around an initial Section 404 report (DSpread) is defined in
Table 2.
RHS variables: MW, DDefaultRisk, DSize, DCFO, DLeverage, DCFVol, DTrsYTM, DRestructure, DWriteDown, DM&A,
and DRestate are defined in Table 2. Rated and Bank are defined in Table 3.
The construction of the sample of 577 (531 non-MW and 46 MW) firms is described in Table 1.
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initial Section 404 report. Of primary interest are the third and fourth results, which suggest that
bank monitoring reduces the impact of reporting a MW in an initial Section 404 report regardless of
credit rating status. These results suggest that the effect of bank monitoring may be the primary
driver of our more general ‘‘monitoring matters’’ results.
Test of H3: Delinquent Filers
We now test whether there is a difference in the change in credit spread between firms that are
delinquent in filing an initial Section 404 report and timely filers. We classify a firm as a delinquent
filer if it does not file an initial Section 404 report within 90 days of its fiscal year-end.28
Conversely, a timely filer is defined as a firm that files an initial Section 404 report within 90 days
of its fiscal year-end.
For each delinquent and timely filer, we measure the change in credit spread (DSpread(adjusted))
around this 90-day cutoff as the mean credit spread for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt
issues over days [þ3, þ45] minus the mean credit spread for all TRACE-reported trades over days
[45, 3] relative to the 90-day cutoff. We then use the 544 sample firms (533 timely filers and 11
delinquent filers) with complete data availability, as of the 90-day cutoff, to estimate a regression of
DSpread(adjusted) on Delinquent and the control variables included in our previous models.
Delinquent is equal to 1 if a firm is a delinquent filer, and 0 otherwise. As reported in Table 5, the
estimated coefficient on Delinquent is significantly positive (p = 0.001).29 Consistent with Ogneva et
al.’s (2007) finding for the cost of equity, the result for Delinquent indicates that delinquent filers
experience a significant increase in credit spread relative to timely filers.
V. COMPARISON TO THE COST OF EQUITY RESULTS IN ASHBAUGH-SKAIFE
ET AL. (2009)
In this section, we compare our findings to those of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), which focus
on the cost of equity rather than the cost of debt. We begin by partitioning the data by the ex ante
probability of reporting a MW, which allows for a more direct comparison between the two
studies.30 To partition the data, we first estimate the logistic probability model in Ashbaugh-Skaife
et al. (2007), using all the firms we identified as releasing an initial Section 404 report between
November 3, 2004, and March 3, 2006, that have the data necessary to estimate the model.31 Next,
we determine the overlap between the firms in the upper and lower halves of the resulting ex ante
probability of reporting a MW distribution and the 577 firms in the sample used to estimate our
earlier models. These procedures result in a sample of 506 firms: 24 MW (134 non-MW) firms in
28 The SEC filing requirement in effect for Form 10-Ks during our sample period is 75 days for accelerated filers,
with an extra 15 days allowed to file without penalty. SEC Release No. 34-50754 (SEC 2004) grants an
additional 45 days beyond the 75-day filing requirement for small accelerated filers to file a Section 404 report.
We choose the 90-day cutoff because we view failing to meet this deadline as an appropriate indicator of
pervasive internal control over financial reporting problems.
29 Consistent with this result, in univariate tests, mean DSpread for delinquent firms (timely filers) is 2.097 (0.532),
and the difference in mean DSpread between the two groups of firms is positive and statistically significant (p =
0.001).
30 We choose Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.’s (2009) results as our benchmark because their test design is similar to ours.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.’s (2009) results do not provide a strict ‘‘apples to apples’’ comparison, primarily because
they examine the disclosure of a Section 302 MW or a Section 404 MW.
31 The determinants in the model are number of business segments, decile rank of sales growth, inventory to assets
ratio, proportion of three preceding years with negative earnings, decile rank of Altman (1968) z-score, percent
of shares held by institutional investors divided by number of institutional owners, market value of equity, and
indicator variables for foreign sales, M&A activity, restructuring, auditor resignation, earnings restatement,
membership in a litigious industry, and use of a large auditor.
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the upper half of the ex ante probability of reporting a MW distribution, and 16 MW (332
non-MW) firms in the lower half. The 158 firms in the upper half of the distribution are coded
HighProb = 1 and the 348 firms in the lower half are coded HighProb = 0.
For these 506 firms, we estimate a regression of DSpread on MW, HighProb, MW  HighProb,
and the control variables included in our previous models. As reported in Table 6, the estimated
coefficient on MW  HighProb is significantly negative (p = 0.001). This result is consistent with
the notion that firms with a low ex ante probability of reporting a MW have a larger increase in
credit spread in response to reporting a MW than firms with a high ex ante probability because the
debt market is more surprised when a low ex ante probability firm reveals a MW.
Comparing our test results to those in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009), similar to their finding
that a firm’s cost of equity increases if it discloses a MW, we find that the disclosure of a MW is
associated with an increase in a firm’s cost of debt. Also, both studies find evidence consistent with
the notion that firms with a low ex ante probability of reporting a MW have a larger increase in their
cost of capital in response to reporting a MW than high ex ante probability firms.
When we partition our sample firms based on whether a firm is monitored by credit rating
agencies and/or banks, we observe that the increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is
more pronounced for firms that are not monitored than for firms that are monitored.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) do not examine the impact of monitoring on the cost of equity.
An interesting issue for future research to examine is whether there are alternate monitoring
TABLE 5
Analysis of the Change in a Firm’s Credit Spread: Timely versus Delinquent Filers
DSpread(adj) = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.801 0.001
Delinquent þ 1.485 0.001
DDefaultRisk þ 0.031 0.653
DSize  0.399 0.759
DCFO  5.946 0.001
DLeverage þ 0.593 0.318
DCFVol þ 13.747 0.062
DTrsYTM  0.518 0.011
DRestructure 0.005 0.490
DWriteDown 0.283 0.096
DM&A 0.164 0.385
DRestate þ 0.009 0.527
Adjusted R2 0.046
a p-values are one-tailed and p = 0.001 indicates that p is less than or equal to 0.001. p-values exceeding 0.500 indicate
that the sign of the estimated coefficient is not in the predicted direction.
The variables (followed by predicted signs) in the OLS regression model reported in this table are as follows:
Dependent variable: The change in a firm’s credit spread (DSpread(adj)), computed as follows. We measure the credit
spread for individual trades in a firm’s debt instruments as YTM on the relevant debt issue minus YTM on a matched-by-
maturity Treasury security. We calculate the mean pre- (post-) cutoff date credit spread for each firm as the mean credit
spread for all TRACE-reported trades occurring over days [–45,3] ([þ3,þ45]) relative to the cutoff of 90 days after a
firm’s fiscal year-end. We calculate the change in credit spread for each firm as its mean post-cutoff credit spread minus
its mean pre-cutoff credit spread.
RHS variables: Delinquent = 1 if a firm does not file an initial Section 404 report within 90 days of its fiscal year-end,
and 0 otherwise. DDefaultRisk, DSize, DCFO, DLeverage, DCFVol, DTrsYTM, DRestructure, DWriteDown, DM&A, and
DRestate are defined in Table 2.
Among the 577 sample firms described in Table 1 that have complete data availability as of the 90-day cutoff date for the
Table 5 tests, there are 533 firms that file a timely report, and 11 firms that are delinquent filers.
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mechanisms in the equity market (e.g., analyst following) that impact the relationship between the
change in a firm’s cost of equity and the disclosure of a MW. Another issue future research might
consider is a test of the differential effect of various monitoring agents (e.g., banks, credit rating
agencies, audit committees, an independent press) on (1) the change in a firm’s cost of equity and
the disclosure of a MW, and (2) the change in a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of a MW.
VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Tests that Classify MW Firms by Severity of MW
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2004) classifies a Section 404 MW as either Category A or
Category B, as follows:
 A Category A MW relates to controls over specific accounts or transaction-level processes.
In general, Moody’s does not bring firms with a Category A MW to their rating committee
to determine if a credit rating downgrade is necessary.
TABLE 6
Analysis of the Change in a Firm’s Credit Spread Following an Initial Section 404 Report
with Control for Probability of Reporting a MW
DSpread = Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 0.630 0.001
MW 1.358 0.001
HighProb 0.299 0.017
MW  HighProb  1.756 0.001
DDefaultRisk þ 0.001 0.493
DSize  0.275 0.714
DCFO  6.180 0.001
DLeverage þ 0.513 0.315
DCFVol þ 22.789 0.003
DTrsYTM  1.035 0.001
DRestructure 0.360 0.038
DWriteDown 0.498 0.007
DM&A 0.017 0.486
DRestate þ 0.118 0.829
Adjusted R2 0.119
a p-values are one-tailed and p = 0.001 indicates that p is less than or equal to 0.001. p-values exceeding 0.500 indicate
that the sign of an estimated coefficient is not in the predicted direction.
The variables (followed by predicted signs) in the OLS regression model reported in this table are as follows:
Dependent variable: The change in a firm’s credit spread around an initial Section 404 report (DSpread) is defined in
Table 2.
RHS variables: MW, DDefaultRisk, DSize, DCFO, DLeverage, DCFVol, DTrsYTM, DRestructure, DWriteDown, DM&A,
and DRestate are defined in Table 2.
Using all the firms we identified as releasing an initial Section 404 report between November 3, 2004, and March 3,
2006, that have the necessary data, we use the logistic probability model in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) to estimate the
ex ante probability of reporting a MW. Next, we determine the overlap between the firms in the upper and lower halves
of the resulting ex ante probability of reporting a MW distribution and the 577 firms in the sample described in Table 1,
resulting in 24 MW (134 non-MW) firms in the upper half of the distribution and 16 MW (332 non-MW) firms in the
lower half. These 506 firms are used to estimate the model in Table 6. For these 506 firms, the 158 firms in the upper half
of the ex ante probability of reporting a MW distribution are coded HighProb = 1, and the 348 firms in the lower half are
coded HighProb = 0.
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 A Category B MW relates to company-level control factors such as the control
environment. In general, Moody’s brings firms with a Category B MW to their rating
committee to determine if a credit rating downgrade is necessary.
A Special Comment of Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (2005b) identifies firms with
Category A or Category B MW. The Special Comment discusses 18 of our 46 sample MW firms.
Among these 18 firms, 11 are classified as Category A and seven are classified as Category B. To
determine if MW classification (i.e., as Category A or Category B) impacts the post-initial
Section 404 report change in credit spread for MW firms, we use the 18 MW firms just described
to estimate a regression of DSpread on ABIndicator (equal to 1 for Category B firms, and 0 for
Category A firms) and the control variables included in our previous models. In this estimate (not
tabled), the coefficient on ABIndicator is positive, as expected, but not statistically significant (p
= 0.274).
Additional Analysis of DealScan Data
It is not necessarily the case that a new or revised bank loan agreement entered into prior to
the initial Section 404 report filing date will still be in effect when the report is filed. Thus, it is
possible that the variable Bank, coded as 1 if a firm has a new or revised bank loan agreement in
any year from 1988 through 2005, and 0 otherwise, has measurement error. In particular, some
firms, coded Bank = 1, may no longer be subject to bank monitoring because all previous bank
loan agreements identified on DealScan have expired as of the initial Section 404 report filing
date.32 In this section, we analyze the DealScan data to assess the sensitivity of our results to this
issue.
When we conduct a detailed analysis of the DealScan data for our firms, 86 percent of the firms
coded as subject to bank monitoring have at least one new or revised bank loan agreement in the
2003 to 2005 window. Also, among the 14 percent of firms whose most recent new or revised bank
loan agreement occurs before 2003, for all but ten of these firms, the most recent agreement is either
a long-term revolving line of credit or a term loan.33 Thus, for all but ten sample firms, the most
recent new or revised bank loan agreement either (1) occurs in a relatively short window preceding
the initial Section 404 report filing date, or (2) involves a loan that is presumably of a long-term
nature. We interpret these observations as suggesting that it is reasonable to code Bank using our
long coding window, especially given the miscoding issue involved using a short coding window
(see footnote 32).
Tests of Change in Credit Rating
Several previous studies examine the relationship between credit rating and MW status. Using
cross-sectional tests, Elbannan (2009) finds that firms that disclose a Section 302 MW or a Section
404 MW have relatively low credit ratings. Using changes tests, Crabtree et al. (2009) find that the
disclosure of a MW in an initial Section 404 report is associated with a rating downgrade. In this
section, we test whether it is the case for our sample firms that the disclosure of a MW in an initial
Section 404 report is associated with a rating downgrade. Our tests regress DRating on the variables
32 We note that the choice of a long coding window is based on a trade-off. If a short window is used, firms that
enter into a still-active bank loan agreement prior to the short window will be miscoded Bank = 0 (as opposed to
the miscoded Bank = 1 firms that result from using a long window).
33 If we remove the ten problem firms from the sample and estimate our models that include the variable Bank, there
is no notable change in our results.
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included in our previous models, where DRating is the change in a firm’s credit rating after a
Section 404 report is filed.34
In this analysis, there are 480 (450 non-MW and 30 MW) firms from the original sample that
have the necessary ratings data. We are unable to estimate models that include the variable Rated
because all firms in these tests are rated. Table 7 summarizes the distribution of MW and non-MW
observations across various credit rating classes in both the pre-Section 404 report period and the
post-Section 404 report period. Consistent with the claim of credit rating agencies that their ratings
reflect internal control deficiencies before they are eventually disclosed in a Section 404 report (e.g.,
Standard & Poor’s [S&P] 2004; Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2005b), MW firms tend to fall
within the lower credit rating classes in the pre-Section 404 report period. Also, in the pre-Section
404 report period, the mean credit rating for MW firms is significantly worse than that of non-MW
firms (p = 0.001; untabulated).
In our model estimates using DRating (untabulated), the coefficient on MW in revised Model
(1) is not statistically significant (p = 0.118). In revised Model (2), the coefficient on MW  Bank,
the coefficient on MW, and the sum of the coefficients on MW and MW  Bank each fail to reach
statistical significance (most significant p = 0.214). These results suggest that, consistent with the
claim of credit rating agencies that their ratings reflect internal control deficiencies before they are
eventually disclosed in a Section 404 report, credit ratings do not appear to be very sensitive to the
disclosure of a MW in an initial Section 404 report.
Comparison to the Results in Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman
(2011)
Concurrent studies by Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) use
bank loan credit spreads to examine some of the same issues investigated in our study. Both Kim et
al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2001) find that there is an increase in a firm’s
cost of debt for new bank loans initiated after reporting a MW. Based on these findings, we view
Kim et al. (2011), Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), and our study as complementary in
that they collectively provide evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley reporting requirements can impact a
firm’s cost of debt in both the private debt market and the public debt market.
We note here that there are many differences in test design among the three studies described in
this section. To provide three examples, we observe the following:
 In difference-in-differences tests, our study focuses on changes in the cost of debt for
existing public debt issues, while Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman
(2011) focus on changes in the cost of debt for new bank loans initiated after reporting a
MW.
 In difference-in-differences tests, the test window in our study is 90 days, the test window
in Kim et al. (2011) is up to four years, and the test window in Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman (2011) exceeds three years.
 In our study and Kim et al. (2011), the major focus is on Section 404 disclosures, while in
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), the major focus is on Section 302 disclosures.
Despite differences in test design, all three studies described in this section find evidence that a
firm’s cost of debt increases after it discloses a MW, suggesting that one benefit of Sarbanes-Oxley
34 Credit rating data are from the Compustat Ratings File, which reports monthly long-term issuer credit ratings for
firms in the S&P 1500. We measure DRating as Rating at the end of month mþ 1 minus Rating at the beginning
of month m 1, where m is the initial Section 404 report filing month. Rating in a given month is coded as in the
Compustat Ratings File (e.g., AAA = 2, AAþ = 4, AA = 5, AA = 6, Aþ = 7, and so forth).
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is that its reporting requirements provide new information to both the private debt market and the
public debt market.
VII. SUMMARY
We find marginal support for the hypothesis that, on average, the disclosure of a MW in an
initial Section 404 report is associated with an increase in the cost of a firm’s publicly traded debt.
Further analysis indicates that this average finding does not hold equally between firms that are
monitored and firms that are not monitored by credit rating agencies and/or banks. Specifically, we
find that the increased cost of debt associated with MW disclosure is more pronounced for firms that
are not monitored than for firms that are monitored. Consistent with the argument that banks are
effective delegated monitors for the debt market, additional analysis indicates that the effect of bank
monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring results.
When we compare our results to the corresponding cost of equity results in Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. (2009), our additional tests of the impact of monitoring allow us to offer several suggestions for
future research. Specifically, we suggest comparing and contrasting the effect of various monitoring
agents on (1) the change in a firm’s cost of equity and the disclosure of a MW, and (2) the change in
a firm’s cost of debt and the disclosure of a MW.
Our study tests for a potential benefit of Sarbanes-Oxley, namely, new information provided to
the public debt market in a Section 404 report. Testing for the existence of the benefits of
Sarbanes-Oxley is important because many corporate executives claim that the costs of
Sarbanes-Oxley outweigh the benefits. For example, in an early 2006 Financial Executives Institute
survey, more than 80 percent of respondents state that the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley outweigh the
benefits (O’Sullivan 2006). Regarding this debate, our results indicate that, on average, a firm’s
TABLE 7
Distribution of MW and Non-MW Observations across Credit Rating Classes
Non-MW Firms
Pre-404
Non-MW Firms
Post-404
MW Firms
Pre-404
MW Firms
Post-404
S&P Credit Rating
AAA rating 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
AA rating range 2.9% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0%
A rating range 20.4% 20.4% 6.7% 6.7%
BBB rating range 34.1% 33.4% 13.3% 13.3%
BB rating range 26.2% 27.3% 36.7% 33.3%
B rating range 15.3% 14.9% 40.0% 43.4%
CCCþ or below 0.7% 0.7% 3.3% 3.3%
Summary
A or above rating 23.7% 23.7% 6.7% 6.7%
Rating from BBBþ to B 75.6% 75.6% 90.0% 90.0%
Rating below B 0.7% 0.7% 3.3% 3.3%
The largest percentage in each column is rounded up or down by 0.1 percent to achieve 100 percent overall.
Table 7 reports the distribution of MW and non-MW observations across various credit rating classes in month m  1
(‘‘Pre-404’’ columns) and in month m þ 1 (‘‘Post-404’’ columns). Credit rating in month m  1 is credit rating at the
beginning of the month preceding the month of an initial Section 404 report. Credit rating in month mþ 1 is credit rating
at the end of the month following the month of an initial Section 404 report. There are 450 non-MW firms and 30 MW
firms in the sample used to construct Table 7. These are the firms that are included in the sample of 577 firms described
in Table 1 that also have the necessary ratings data available in the Compustat Ratings File, which reports monthly long-
term issuer credit ratings for firms in the S&P 1500.
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credit spread on its publicly traded debt increases if it discloses a MW in an initial Section 404 report.
This finding suggests that one benefit of Section 404 reporting is that it can provide new information
to the public debt market.35 We hasten to add that this conclusion does not consider whether the costs
of complying with Section 404 reporting requirements outweigh the benefits.
We conclude with a discussion of sample size and model fit. Regarding sample size, the
number of MW firms in some sample cells is quite small. Thus, we acknowledge that some of
our inferences are based on small sample cell sizes. However, we believe that these inferences are
reliable given that our population of interest in these cells is relatively small to begin with. For
example, in our joint tests of monitoring effects, there are five firms in the cell ‘‘MW firms
monitored by banks but not by credit rating agencies.’’ This small sample size is mainly a
function of the relatively small population of firms that satisfy all of the following six conditions:
(1) are an accelerated filer, (2) report a MW in an initial Section 404 report, (3) do not report a
prior Section 302 MW, (4) have publicly traded debt, (5) are not rated by S&P or Moody’s, and
(6) have a new or revised bank loan agreement between 1988 and 2005. Regarding model fit, we
use changes tests that include variables that attempt to control for factors and events, other than
the information in an initial Section 404 report, that could influence the post-report change in a
firm’s credit spread. However, given the difficulty of identifying and accurately measuring all
such factors and events, we acknowledge that our models could be missing some relevant control
variables.
REFERENCES
Altman, E. I. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis, and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy.
Journal of Finance 23 (4): 589–609.
Altman, E. I., A. Gande, and A. Saunders. 2010. Bank debt versus bond debt: Evidence from secondary
market prices. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42 (4): 755–767.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and W. R. Kinney, 2007. The discovery and reporting of internal
control deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (1–2):
166–192.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, W. R. Kinney, Jr., and R. LaFond. 2009. The effect of SOX internal
control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal of Accounting Research 47 (1): 1–43.
Begley, J., J. Ming, and S. Watts. 1996. Bankruptcy classification errors in the 1980s: An empirical analysis
of Altman’s and Ohlson’s models. Review of Accounting Studies 1 (4): 267–284.
Beneish, M. D., M. B. Billings, and L. D. Hodder. 2008. Internal control weaknesses and information
uncertainty. The Accounting Review 83 (3): 665–704.
Bharath, S. T., J. Sunder, and S. V. Sunder. 2008. Accounting quality and debt contracting. The Accounting
Review 83 (1): 1–28.
Bhojraj, S., and P. Sengupta. 2003. Effects of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of
institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of Business 76 (3): 455–476.
Botosan, C. A., and M. Plumlee. 2005. Assessing alternative proxies for the expected risk premium. The
Accounting Review 80 (1): 21–53.
Choi, J., and M. P. Richardson. 2010. The volatility of the firm’s assets. Working paper, University of
Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and New York University. Available at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1359368.
35 As noted previously, consistent with this inference, concurrent research by Kim et al. (2011) and Costello and
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) finds evidence suggesting that one benefit of Sarbanes-Oxley is that its reporting
requirements provide new information to the private (i.e., bank loan) debt market.
Internal Control Disclosures, Monitoring, and the Cost of Debt 1153
The Accounting Review
July 2011
Costello, A., and R. Wittenberg-Moerman. 2011. The impact of financial reporting quality on debt
contracting: Evidence from internal control weakness reports. Journal of Accounting Research 49 (1):
97–136.
Crabtree, A., J. J. Maher, and D. Wang. 2009. Corporate internal control disclosures and credit ratings.
Working paper, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Virginia Tech, and Texas A&M University.
Datta, S., M. Iskandar-Datta, and A. Patel. 2000. Do bank relationships matter in public debt offerings?
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12 (4): 120–127.
DeFond, M., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violations and manipulation of accruals. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 17 (1–2): 145–176.
Diamond, D. 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The Review of Economic Studies 51
(3): 393–414.
Doyle, J., W. Ge, and S. McVay. 2007. Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (1–2): 193–223.
Duffee, G. R. 1998. The relation between treasury yields and corporate bond yield spreads. Journal of
Finance 53 (6): 2225–2241.
Elbannan, M. A. 2009. Quality of internal control over financial reporting, corporate governance and credit
ratings. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 6 (2): 127–149.
Fama, E. 1985. What’s different about banks? Journal of Monetary Economics 15 (1): 29–39.
Federal Reserve Board. 2006. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 (Treasury Yields). Available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/H15/data.htm.
Ge, W., and S. McVay. 2005. The disclosure of material weaknesses in internal control after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Accounting Horizons 19 (3): 137–158.
Hogan, C. E., and M. S. Wilkins. 2008. Evidence on the audit risk model: Do auditors increase audit fees in
the presence of internal control deficiencies? Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 219–242.
James, C. M. 1987. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Financial Economics 19
(2): 217–235.
Kim, J., B. Y. Song, and L. Zhang. 2011. Internal control weakness and bank loan contracting: Evidence
from SOX Section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 86 (4): 1157–1188.
Lambert, R. A., C. Leuz, and R. E. Verrecchia. 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of
capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45 (2): 385–420.
Longstaff, F. A., and E. S. Schwartz. 1995. A simple approach to valuing risky fixed and floating rate debt.
Journal of Finance 50 (3): 789–819.
Mansi, S. A., W. F. Maxwell, and D. P. Miller. 2004. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors?
Evidence from the bond market. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (4): 755–793.
Mergent Inc. 2005. Mergent Bond Record. New York, NY: Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2004. Moody’s Special Comment: Section 404 Reports on Internal
Control: Impact on Ratings Will Depend on Nature of Material Weaknesses Reported. New York,
NY: Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2005a. Moody’s Special Comment: Credit Implications for Companies
That Fail to File Internal Control Reports on Time. New York, NY: Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. 2005b. Moody’s Special Comment: Section 404 Reporting on Internal
Control: Our Early Experience. New York, NY: Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 2004. An Overview of the Regulation of the Bond
Markets. Testimony of Doug Shulman, President NASD Markets, Services and Information, before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (June 17). Available at: http://
banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=182c34a9-bedb-4f65-
ba0c-75d98f728525.
Neal, R., D. S. Rolph, and C. Morris. 2001. Interest rates and credit spread dynamics. Working paper,
Indiana University and City University of Hong Kong. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=249983.
Ogneva, M., K. Raghunandan, and K. R. Subramanyam. 2007. Internal control weakness and implied cost
of equity: Evidence from SOX Section 404 disclosures. The Accounting Review 82 (5): 1255–1297.
1154 Dhaliwal, Hogan, Trezevant, and Wilkins
The Accounting Review
July 2011
Ohlson, J. 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting
Research 18 (1): 109–131.
O’Sullivan, K. 2006. The case for clarity. CFO (September 1): 64–69. Available at: http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/7851741/c_7873404.
Petersen, M. A., and R. G. Rajan. 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business
data. Journal of Finance 49 (1): 3–37.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2004. An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements. Auditing Standard No. 2.
Washington, D.C.: PCAOB.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2007. An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements and Related Independence Rule
and Conforming Amendments. Auditing Standard No. 5. Washington, D.C.: PCAOB.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2003. Final Rule: Management’s Report on Internal Control
over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports. Release
Nos. 33–8238 and 34–47986; File Nos. S7-40-02 and S7-06-03. Washington, D.C.: SEC.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2004. Order under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Granting an Exemption from Specified Provisions of Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1.
Release No. 34–50754. Washington, D.C.: SEC.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2005. Self-Regulatory Organizations: National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc.: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Dissemination of
Information on TRACE-Eligible Securities Transactions. Release No. 34–52700; File No. SR-
NASD-2005-120. Washington, D.C.: SEC.
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). 2009. Investing in bonds. Available at:
http://www.investinginbonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcatid=18&id=174.
Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 73 (4): 459–
474.
Standard & Poor’s (S&P). 2004. Corporate Rating Criteria. New York, NY: Standard & Poor’s.
APPENDIX A
Data Sources for Test Variables
Yield = the mean YTM for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues over a specified
time period. Data Source: WRDS TRACE data;
Spread = the mean credit spread for all TRACE-reported trades in a firm’s debt issues over a
specified time period. We measure the credit spread for each trade as YTM on the relevant
debt issue minus YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security. Data Sources: WRDS
TRACE data and Treasury yield data;
MW = 1 if a firm reports a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report, and 0 if it does
not report a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report. Data Source: Audit
Analytics;
Rated = 1 if a firm’s debt is rated by S&P and/or Moody’s, and 0 otherwise. Data Sources:
Compustat (S&P rating) and Mergent Bond Record (Moody’s rating);
Bank = 1 if a firm has a new or revised bank loan agreement in any year from 1988 to 2005,
and 0 otherwise. Data Source: DealScan;
DefaultRisk = the score from the bankruptcy model of Ohlson (1980). Higher values of
DefaultRisk indicate a higher probability of default risk. Data Source: Compustat;
Size = the log of total assets. Data Source: Compustat;
CFO = cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. Data Source: Compustat;
Leverage = long-term debt scaled by total assets. Data Source: Compustat;
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CFVol = the standard deviation over the last 20 quarters of cash flow from operations scaled
by total assets. Data Source: Compustat;
TrsYTM = the mean of all ‘‘YTM on a matched-by-maturity Treasury security’’ used to
calculate a firm’s Spread over a specified time period. Data Source: Treasury yield data;
and
Restructure (WriteDown; M&A; Restate) = an indicator variable equal to 1 if restructuring
(writedown; M&A; restatement) activity occurs in a given period, and 0 otherwise. Data
Sources: Compustat and Audit Analytics.
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